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BLD-159        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1526 
____________ 
 
RORY M. WALSH,  
individually; and as Natural Guardian of C.R.W., a minor, 
 
v. 
 
DR. ROBERT KRANTZ; MRS. SHARI YOUNG;  
MRS SUE CATHCART; MRS KEENEY; MRS KELLY  
HEISEY; UNKNOWN DALLASTOWN STAFF MEMBER;  
DR. STEWART WEINBERG; DALLASTOWN AREA  
SCHOOL DISTRICT; CATHY STONE; GREG ANDERSON, 
 
RORY M WALSH, individually; and as Natural  
Guardian of C.R.W; *S.J.W., Appellants. 
 
* (Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.) 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-00616) 
District Judge: Christopher C. Conner 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted on a Motion for Summary Affirmance 
April 7, 2011 
 
Present: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 18, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Appellant Rory M. Walsh filed a civil action pro se in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Dallastown Area School 
District and a number of its officials and staff members.  Walsh filed the action on behalf 
of himself individually and his son, C.R.W., a Dallastown Area Middle School student.  
The District Court dismissed several counts in the complaint pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion filed by the defendants.  Walsh was granted leave to amend and he filed an 
amended complaint adding new counts.  The defendants moved to dismiss the amended 
complaint, and the District Court then dismissed several more counts.  Discovery ensued.  
Walsh deposed several of the defendants and the defendants deposed Walsh.  At the 
conclusion of discovery, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56(c).  After the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation, 
the District Court, in an order and judgment entered on December 18, 2009, granted the 
defendants’ motion, and granted judgment in favor of the defendants. 
Walsh appealed (C.A. No. 10-1217), and, after the appeal was fully briefed, we 
affirmed on July 12, 2010.  Walsh then filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which we 
denied, and a motion for a remand, which he then corrected.  Walsh questioned whether 
we had authority to rely on parts of the district court record not included in the appendix.  
In denying his motion to remand, we noted that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
30(a)(2) permits us to review the entire district court record in determining whether to 
uphold a judgment.  Walsh then filed a second motion for a remand, challenging our 
interpretation of the federal appellate rules.  We denied that motion with a note stating 
that we would not accept any further submissions.  Walsh filed a petition for writ of 
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certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on December 6, 2010.  
The Supreme Court denied Walsh’s petition for rehearing on January 24, 2011. 
 On January 28, 2011, Walsh filed a motion in the district court to reopen the 
judgment, in which he alleged “criminal actions” on the part of counsel for the 
defendants, and “recent actions” by the Dallastown Solicitor.  Specifically, Walsh alleged 
that appellees’ counsel, James W. Gicking, Esquire, “chopped up” his appeal in this 
Court and planted and suppressed evidence, and that Gicking had admitted to doing so to 
disciplinary counsel for the state supreme court, see Motion, at ¶ 4.  Walsh alleged that 
Gicking locked his filings and removed exhibits from the electronic case filing system at 
the Third Circuit, see id. at ¶ 5.  Last, Walsh alleged that Gicking used a deceased New 
York attorney’s name on his brief in opposition to Walsh’s petition for writ of certiorari 
before the United States Supreme Court, see id. at ¶ 6.  Walsh alleged that Dallastown 
Solicitor, Jeffrey L. Rehmeyer, tried to serve documents on him personally despite the 
fact that Rehmeyer is represented by counsel.  See Brief in Support of Motion to Reopen, 
at 8. 
The defendants filed a response in opposition to reopening the judgment, in which 
Gicking specifically addressed and denied Walsh’s allegations and factual assertions as 
specious. 
In an order entered on February 14, 2011, the District Court denied Walsh’s 
motion to reopen the judgment, and indicated, as we did on appeal, that it would accept 
no further filings in the matter seeking to reopen or reconsider the judgment.   
 Walsh appeals.  Following the docketing of his appeal and prior to any briefing, 
the appellees filed a motion for summary affirmance, in which they have also requested 
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Rule 38 costs.  Walsh has filed a written response in opposition to summary action and 
Rule 38 costs. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and 
I.O.P. 10.6, we may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears that no 
substantial question is presented by the appeal.  We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) 
motion for an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Reform Party of Allegheny County v. 
Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999).  “The general 
purpose of Rule 60(b) ... is to strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles 
that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice must be done."  Bougher v. 
Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978).  Rule 60(b) sets 
forth exceptions to finality that permit a party to seek relief from a final judgment under a 
specific set of circumstances.  See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005). 
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal.  We note as a threshold matter that the District Court 
properly considered Walsh’s motion to reopen under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b).  None of the rules or decisions cited by Walsh provide a basis for reopening the 
judgment pursuant to a motion filed in the district court.  Only Rule 60(b) serves that 
purpose in Walsh’s case, and he thus must comply with the requirements of the rule.  In 
addition, the District Court properly determined that Walsh’s motion was untimely under 
the first three grounds for Rule 60(b) relief because it was not filed within one year of the 
District Court’s summary judgment.  See Rule 60(c)(1)(A) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) 
must be made within a reasonable time – and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a 
year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding”); Moolenaar v. 
5 
 
Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir. 1987) (two years not “reasonable 
time” for 60(b) purposes).  The District Court properly determined that grounds four and 
five plainly do not apply to Walsh’s allegations. 
We conclude that no substantial question is presented by the District Court’s 
determination that no extraordinary circumstances justifying relief under subparagraph 
(b)(6), the “catch all” provision of Rule 60, are presented by Walsh’s current allegations.   
Relief is available only when the case presents extraordinary circumstances.  See, e.g., 
Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977).  Walsh’s 
allegations against Gicking and Rehmeyer concern conduct in our Court and the United 
States Supreme Court during the course of Walsh’s appeal.  These allegations of post-
judgment conduct, as a matter of fact, have no relevance to the District Court’s 
determination that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
1
  Walsh’s 
allegation that Carol Stein lied at her deposition may be considered in determining 
whether the summary judgment should be reopened under Rule 60(b)(6), but neither 
Walsh’s personal belief that Stein’s testimony was false nor the police report he believes 
corroborates his allegation establishes that extraordinary circumstances warrant 
reopening the judgment. 
The appellees contend in their motion for summary affirmance that Walsh’s 
appeal from the District Court’s order denying his motion to reopen the judgment is 
plainly frivolous, and thus we should award costs pursuant to Rule 38, Fed. R. App. Pro. 
                                              
1
 In any event, we agree with the District Court’s observation in the margin that Walsh’s 
evidence did not support his contentions that Gicking “hacked the Third Circuit ECF 
filing system and locked Walsh out or chopped up his filings;” admitted misconduct in a 
disciplinary proceeding; and filed a brief under the name of a deceased attorney, or his 
contention that Rehmeyer violated his constitutional rights.  See District Court 
Memorandum, at 6-7 n.2.  
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The appellees have complained about Walsh’s specious accusations, including, for 
example, his fabricated and untruthful claim that Gicking used the name of a deceased 
attorney to file his response to the petition for writ of certiorari.  The appellees also 
complain about the expense of defending this appeal.  Walsh has responded by, among 
other things, noting that he has two children to support, and that costs were awarded 
against him in his last appeal (which we note was not frivolous), and yet the appellees 
never filed a bill of costs.  See generally LAR 39.4(a) (“The court will deny untimely 
bills of cost unless a motion showing good cause is filed with the bill.”). 
We will deny the request for damages without prejudice.  “If a court of appeals 
determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may ... award just damages and single or double 
costs to the appellee.”  Fed. R. App. Pro. 38.  Damages are awarded based on the merits 
of the appeal; we do not consider whether an appellant has acted “out of malice, 
ignorance, or deceit.”  Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2004).  Rule 38 serves 
“to make whole a party victimized by needlessly having to expend money for attorneys 
fees to protect a valid judgment from a baseless attack.”  Id.  Although we agree with the 
appellees that Walsh has persisted in his misguided arguments and specious factual 
assertions, and that this appeal is frivolous, the appellees were able to use our summary 
action procedure to good effect and will not have to file a brief.  However, should Walsh 
file any frivolous post-decision motions in this appeal, the appellees may, in any response 
in opposition, renew their request for attorneys’ fees.  They should specify the amount of 
the fees requested so that we may impose an order without further delay. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
denying Walsh’s motion to reopen the judgment.  The appellees’ Rule 38 request for 
costs is denied without prejudice. 
